Abstract. Since the Merkle-Damgård (MD) type hash functions are differentiable from ROs even when compression functions are modeled by ideal primitives, there is no guarantee as to the security of cryptosystems when ROs are instantiated with structural hash functions. In this paper, we study the security of the instantiated cryptosystems whereas the hash functions have the well known structure of Merkle-Damgård construction with Stam's type-II compression function (denoted MDTypeII) in the Ideal Cipher Model (ICM). Note that since the Type-II scheme includes the DaviesMeyer compression function, SHA-256 and SHA-1 have the MD-TypeII structure.
Introduction
The Random Oracle (RO) Methodology is a well known methodology for designing efficient cryptosystems and many important cryptosystems have been designed on RO methodology. For example, RSA-OAEP [3] , RSA-PSS [3] , RSA-KEM [37] , PSEC-KEM [37] , and ECIES-KEM [37] , which are standardized in RSA's PKCS #1 V2.1 or ISO 18033-2, are designed by this methodology. In this methodology, hash functions are viewed as ROs. When implementing a cryptosystem, RO is instantiated by a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-2 family and SHA-1 [31] . However, since there are several separation results for ROs and cryptographic hash functions [11] , the heuristic evidence of the methodology is questionable.
In order to fill the theoretical gap, Coron, Dodis, Malinaud, and Puniya [15] introduced a new property of hash functions called indifferentiability from RO. In this property, while underlying primitive P (e.g. compression function) is in the ideal model, if hash function H P , which is constructed from P , is indifferentiable from RO, we can use H P as an RO. Namely, this property fills the structural gap between hash functions and ROs while underlying primitives follow ideal models.
The popular hash functions are SHA-2 family hash functions (e.g. SHA-256 and SHA-512) that are published as FIPS standard. These hash functions use the Merkle-Damgård (MD) structure [17, 29] and the Davies-Meyer compression function (DMCF). While the MD hash function with DMCF (DMMDHF) offers collision resistance in the Ideal Cipher Model (ICM) [5] , the DMMDHF is differentiable from RO due to the extension attack. The attack is that for DMMDHF H, H(m 1 ||m 2 ) is calculated from H(m 1 ) and m 2 . On the other hand, the attack cannot be applied to ROs. Due to the state of differentiability, there is no guarantee as to the security of cryptosystems when RO is instantiated with DMMDHF. This leaves open the question whether or not cryptosystems can be securely instantiated when RO is replaced by DMMDHF.
Dodis, Restinpart and Shrimpton answered the question for several cryptosystems [19] . They proved that several cryptosystems are secure when RO is instantiated with a MD hash function that use Stam's Type-II compression function [39] (denoted MD-TypeII) in the ICM. Note that since the Type-II scheme includes DMCF (and also several PGV schemes [35, 5] ), the MD-TypeII hash function includes DMMDHF. In order to prove the security, they proposed the Weakened Random Oracle (WRO) approach. This approach states that for hash function H (1) define a WRO such that H is indifferentiable from WRO and (2) prove the security of cryptosystems in the WRO model. They defined public-use Random Oracle (pub-RO) that leaks the hash list of a random oracle. They showed that the MD-typeII hash function is indifferentiable from pub-RO. Since adversaries know all inputs of random oracles for FDH [2] , PFDH [14] , Fiat-Shamir [20] , BLS [8] , PSS [4] , a variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE [36] and Boneh-Boyern IBE [9] , the additional function of pub-RO does not leak any useful information to the adversaries. Therefore, these cryptosystems are secure in the pub-RO model. Thus these cryptosystems are secure when RO is instantiated with the MD-typeII hash function. We call these cryptosystems "pub-RO secure cryptosystems".
Open Problems. While many cryptosystems are secure when RO is instantiated with the MDTypeII hash function, the security of the following important cryptosystems remains unclear.
1. Since OAEP [4] , RSA-KEM [37] , PSEC-KEM [37] , ECIES-KEM [37] and many other encryption schemes are insecure in the pub-RO model [40, 30] , the result of Dodis et al. [19] provide no support for the security of these cryptosystems with the MD-TypeII hash function. Therefore, the security of these important encryption schemes remains an open problem. 2. When RO has longer output length than the hash function, RO is instantiated by the Key Derivation Function (KDF) [37] . Note that KDFs include MGF1 [26] , Bellare-Rogaway 96 scheme [4] and so on. While Dodis et al. proved that pub-RO secure cryptosystems are secure when RO is instantiated with the MD-TypeII hash function, they did not consider the KDF's structure. Therefore, the security of these cryptosystems using KDFs remains an open problem, since there might exist some attack based on the KDF's structure.
Security of Encryption Schemes. First, we show that OAEP, RSA-KEM, PSEC-KEM, ECIES-KEM, and many other encryption schemes (e.g. OAEP+ [38] , SAEP [7] , SAEP+ [7] , and many other schemes [1, 13, 16, 18, 25, 24, 33, 34] ) are secure in ICM when using the MD-typeII hash function and KDFs with MD-typeII hash functions (denote KDF-MD-typeII). To confirm the security of these encryptions, we customize the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner and Holenstein [28] . We call the customized framework indifferentiability with condition.
In this framework, we consider some condition α that cryptosystem C satisfies. If hash function H is indifferentiable from RO under condition α, C is secure when RO is replaced by H. α is the condition of inputs to H. Namely, we say that "cryptosystem C satisfies condition α" if all input values from C to H satisfy condition α and "H is indifferentiable from RO under condition α" if H is indifferentiable from RO when all queries from any distinguisher to H/RO satisfy condition α. We introduce the following procedure to confirm the security of the cryptosystems.
1. Identify condition α that the cryptosystems satisfy. 2. Prove that the (KDF-)MD-typeII hash function is indifferentiable from RO under condition α.
Step 1 : We note the condition of the encryption schemes: the input size of the hash function is fixed. Namely, all input values, x, x , of the hash function satisfy |x| = |x |. For any different two values x, x that yield |x| = |x |, x is not a prefix of x , the encryption schemes satisfy the condition "prefix-free". Therefore, we use the condition "prefix-free".
Step 2 : In order to prove that the (KDF-)MD-typeII hash functions are indifferentiable from ROs under the condition "prefix-free", we propose the following approach. Let H be a hash function and pfpad be any prefix-free padding function.
-If H • pfpad is indifferentiable from RO, H is indifferentiable from RO under the condition "prefix-free" where H • pfpad is a hash function with prefix-free padding.
The first item implies that the result of the indifferentiability for H • pfpad can be transformed into the result of the indifferentiability with condition for H. From the second item, we can conclude that H is indifferentiable from RO under the condition "prefix-free". We show that the (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions with any prefix-free padding are indifferentiable from ROs. Therefore, the (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions are indifferentiable from ROs under the condition "prefix-free".
The above two steps allow us to conclude that OAEP, RSA-KEM, PSEC-KEM, ECIES-KEM and many other encryption schemes are secure when ROs are instantiated with the (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash function. Several papers [10, 6, 23, 32] showed that padding-based encryption schemes (e.g., OAEP) are provably unprovable in the standard model when using a black-box reduction. Namely, the encryption schemes are provably unprovable when considering "full" structures of hash functions. Our result shows that the security of the encryption schemes are provable when considering structures of the (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions except for block ciphers. That is, our result shows that there is no generic attack on the encryption schemes that use (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions that treat block ciphers like ideal ciphers.
Security of Pub-RO Secure Cryptosystems Using KDF-MD-TypeII Hash Functions. By using the WRO approach, we show that the pub-RO secure cryptosystems are secure when ROs are instantiated with KDF-MD-TypeII hash functions in the ICM. First we show that KDFs using pub-RO are differentiable from pub-RO. Thus we cannot simply extend the result of Dodis et al. to the indifferentiability for the KDF-MD-TypeII hash functions. Therefore we propose a new WRO called private interface leaking RO (privleak-RO). The oracle leaks all input-output pairs of a private interface of RO that are used in cryptosystem calculations but does not leak input-output pairs of the public interface. Since adversaries know all inputs of the random oracles in pub-RO secure cryptosystems, these cryptosystems are secure even when ROs replaced by privleak-ROs. We show that KDFs using pub-ROs are indifferentiable from privleak-ROs. Since MD-typeII hash functions are indifferentiable from pub-RO, the KDF-MD-typeII hash functions are indifferentiable from privleak-ROs. As a result, pub-RO secure cryptosystems are secure when RO is instantiated with the KDF-MD-typeII hash function.
Related Works. Leurent and Nguyen [27] studied the security of cryptosystems when ROs are replaced with KDFs that use weakened hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5. They showed that these hash functions offer much lower security than the theoretical security of RO. For example, when the output length of RO is 1024 bits, a collision of KDF3 using MD5 is found with 2 106 MD5 computations and a preimage is found with 2 166 MD5 computations. They also examined the security of padding-based signature schemes when ROs are replaced with the weakened hash functions. They showed that for several signature schemes a collision of a hash function can be transformed into a key recovery attack. Their analyses examined the case of weakened hash functions. Our analyses examine the case of secure hash functions.
Coron, Dodis, Malinaud and Puniya [15] , Chang, Lee, Nandi and Yung [12] , and Gong, Lai and Chen [21] proved that the MD hash functions with any prefix-free padding with several PGV schemes are indifferentiable from ROs. However, these results don't imply that cryptosystems satisfying the "prefix-free" condition are secure when ROs are instantiated with MD hash functions without prefix-free padding. The result of the first point of the above step 2 is needed to prove the security of the cryptosystems. Note that by using the above first point, these indifferentiability results can be transformed into a proof of indifferentiability with condition. Naito, Yoneyama, Wang and Ohta [30] defined Extension Attack Simulatable Random Oracle (ERO) to which the extension attack can be applied. They showed that the MD hash function in the fixed input length (FIL) RO model is indifferentiable from ERO and OAEP, its variants and RSA-KEM are secure in the ERO model. Since the Type-II scheme is differentiable from FILRO, the result cannot be transformed into a proof of indifferentiable for the (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions. 
Preliminaries

Definition 1. W is (t A , t S , )-indifferentiable from U, if there exists S of running time at most t S for any A of running time at most t A such that
We denote "W is indifferentiable from U" by W U.
We say "W is indifferentiable from U " or W U when is negligible. From the definition, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 1. If W U, then for any cryptosystem C C(W) is at least as secure as C(U). We denote "C(W) is at least as secure as C(U )" by C(W) C(U).
C(W) C(U) means that if C(W) is secure then C(U ) is also secure. The definition of C(W) C(U) is as follows.
Definition 2. C(W) C(U ) if for all environments Env (distinguisher of C) the following holds: For any attacker A accessing C(W priv ) and W pub there exists an attacker
In the experiment of indifferentiability of hash function H P using a primitive P from RO, A interacts with (H P , P ) or (RO, S RO ). Simulator S simulates P .
Merkle-Damgård.
Let h : {0, 1} d+n → {0, 1} n be a compression function using primitive P (more strictly h P ) and pad : {0, 1} * → ({0, 1} d ) * be a padding function. We define MerkleDamgård hash function MD h as follows where IV is an n-bit initial value.
We write MD h , when padding pad is the prefix-free padding pfpad, by PFMD h . 
n are functions called preprocessing and postprocessing, respectively.
He also defined auxiliary post-processing function
y). Stam defined a Type-II scheme iff Stam defined
Type-II block-cipher-based compression function [39] . Compression function SCF is the Type-II scheme if:
is bijective, and 3) for all k, the inverse map
The Type-II scheme includes the Group-2 PGV schemes and 8 Group PGV schemes (e.g. Davies-Meyer) in [5, 35] . The Davies-Meyer has
KDFs [37] . Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be a hash function. KDF1, KDF2 and KDF3 are defined [19] . Pub-RO consists of RO F b and Leak Oracle (LO) F leak that leaks the RO list. The description is as follows where F b is a RO whose the output size is b bit and F leak is a LO.
Public-use Random Oracle
When the output size of a RO is b, we write it by pub-RO b . Dodis et al. showed that when SCF is the type-II scheme, MD
Security of Encryption Schemes Using (KDF-)MD-typeII Hash Functions
We customize the indifferentiability framework [28] called "the indifferentiability with condition". By using the framework, we show that OAEP, RSA-KEM, PSEC-KEM, ECIES-KEM and many other encryption schemes using (KDF-)MD-typeII hash functions are secure in the ICM.
Indifferentiability with Condition
We propose indifferentiability with condition. In this framework, we restrict queries to a private interface by some condition. Let P be an ideal primitive and H P be a hash function. 
From the definition, the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 1. Let C be any cryptosystem wherein queries to hash functions are restricted to
Proof. Let us start with the first implication ("⇒"). Assume that ∀A, ∃S such that A is restricted by the condition α,
where Env is any environment and A is any attacker
The second implication ("⇐") is proven by using the same as the proof of Theorem 1 of [28] . Since we do not use this result, we omit its proof.
Indifferentiability Results for (KDF-)MD-type-II Hash Functions
First we pick up the condition "prefix-free". Since input sizes of OAEP, RSA-KEM, PSEC-KEM, ECIES-KEM and many other encryption schemes are fixed, these cryptosystems satisfy the condition "prefix-free".
Second we prove that (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions are indifferentiable from ROs under the condition "prefix-free". Let P be an ideal function, H P be a hash function using P and G P be a hash function H P with a prefix-free padding pfpad. Namely G P (M ) = H P (pfpad(M )). First we show that if G P is indifferentiable from RO, H P is indifferentiable from RO under the condition "prefix-free" (Theorem 2).
Since pfpad is an injective function, for a fresh query
Since A is any distinguisher and pfpad is any prefix-free padding, A 1 is any distinguisher where queries to H P /F n are restricted by condition "prefix-free". The proof is completed.
By using Theorem 2, we show that (KDF-)MD-TypeII hash functions are indifferentiable from ROs under the condition "prefix-free". First we show that the MD-TypeII hash function with a prefix-free padding is indifferentiable from RO as follows.
Theorem 3. Let SCF be the type-II scheme. PFMD
where A can make queries to PFMD This proof is shown in Subsection 3.3. For KDF1, we can see that F n ( * || 0 ), F n ( * || 1 ), . . . , F n ( * || m−1 ) are independent random oracles. A hash function concatenating m independent random oracles is a random oracle F mn . The same is true for KDF2 and KDF3. Thus, the following theorem holds. 
Proof of Theorem 3
We define a simulator S = (S E , S D ) as follows.
Calculate x and m where
x ← x and goto Line 110; 110
S E simulates E and S D simulates D. In the following proof, we write an input-output triple of S E /E and S D /D by (k, x, y), the input of the type-II scheme using S E by (v, m) and the output by w. Namely (v, m) ← C −PRE (k, x) and w ← C POST (v, m, y). We define chain triples and pf-chain triples. 
In order to prove that Game 0 is equal to Game 1 unless the following bad events occur, we use the technique of [22] . Namely, we show the following three points. Let G0 and G1 be events that A outputs 1 in Game 0 and Game 1, respectively. If the above three points hold,
r[E1] + P r[E2] + P r[E3] + P r[E4] + P r[E5]. So we show that P r[E1], P r[E2], P r[E3], P r[E4] and P r[E5] are negligible.
Before starting the proof of the above points, we give a useful lemma.
Lemma 2. For any pf-chain triples
Proof. To the contrary, assume that there are pf-chain triples (
We divide this case into the following cases. We consider the case 1-b. In this case, since V(
We divide the case into the following cases.
, a collision occurs for the hash function iterating the type-II scheme using O E . Since a collision of the hash function can be reduced into an event of the compression function; finding a collision or finding a preimage of IV , event E1 or E2 occurs.
We assume that t is the minimum value. When t = 1, E5 occurs from the same discussion as the case 1-a-(t = 1). 
-a-(1 < t < i).
We consider the case 2-a. Since y i is defined in line 102 (V(v i−1 ) =⊥), when (k i , x i , y i ) is defined, there does not exist some triple (k t , x t , y t ) such that t < i and (k t , x t , y t ) is defined after (k i , x i , y i ) is defined. This case is equal to the case 1-a. Therefore, in this case event E3, E4 or E5 occurs.
Finally we consider the case 2-b. In this case, since V(
This case is equal to the case 1-b. Therefore, in this case event E1, E2, E3, E4 or E5 occurs.
The proof of the lemma is completed.
By using the lemma, we prove the three points. 
Since y is chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n that is independent from (k , x , y ), w are chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n and independently from (k , x , y ). Since the maximum number of such triple is lq 
.
Game 1→Game 2:
Let G2 be an event that A outputs 1 in Game 2. Since outputs of S E and S D are chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n , S E = E and S D = D unless a collision occurs. Thus we have via a straightforward birthday analysis that
. The proof of the theorem is completed.
Security of Pub-RO Secure Cryptosystems Using KDF-MD-typeII Hash Functions
In this section, by using the WRO approach, we show that pub-RO secure cryptosystems are secure when ROs are instantiated with the KDF-MD-TypeII hash functions. Note that pub-RO secure cryptosystems are that all inputs of hash functions are public (e.g. FDH, PFDH, FiatShamir, BLS, PSS, a variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE and Boneh-Boyern IBE). First we show that KDFs using pub-RO are differentiable from pub-RO. Therefore, we cannot trivially extend the result of [19] to a proof of indifferentiability for KDF-MD-TypeII hash functions. Therefore, we propose a new WRO, called private interface leaking random oracle (privleak-RO). Roughly speaking, privleak-RO leaks all input-output pairs of the private interface of RO but does not leak an input-output pairs of the public interface of RO. Since an adversary can obtain all inputs of hash functions in pub-RO secure cryptosystems in the RO model, the pub-RO secure cryptosystems are secure in the privleak-RO model. We show that KDFs using pub-RO are indifferentiable from privleak-ROs. Since the MD-TypeII hash function is indifferentiable from pub-RO [19] , the KDF-MD-TypeII hash functions are indifferentiable from privleak-ROs.
Differentiable Attack for KDFs using pub-RO
We show that KDF1-pub-RO n , KDF2-pub-RO n and KDF3-pub-RO n are differentiable from pub-RO nm as follows. We only show that KDF1-pub-RO n is differentiable from pub-RO nm . For KDF2-pub-RO n and KDF3-pub-RO n , we can prove them by the similar proof. Let S = (S leak , S F pub ) be any simulator that simulates F leak and F pub nm respectively. Let
We define a distinguisher A as follows. Consider that A interacts with (F priv nm , S). When S does not make query M to F nm (M ), the probability that A returns 0 is negligible due to step 1-g. This implies that S should make the query M to F nm (M ). Thus when the step 1-e is executed, in list L leak of F nm the pair (M, z) shold be stored. When step 1-e is invoked, S does not know whether A makes query M to F priv mn or not. Note that if j = 0, pairs (M || 0 , z [1] ), (M || 1 , z [2] ), . . . should be stored in list L and if j = 1, only the pair (M || 0 , z [1] ) should be stored in list L. Since j is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}, when A interacts with (F priv nm , S), in Step 1-e S leak mistakes the simulation, thus A outputs 1 with non-negligible probability. On the other hand, when A interacts with (KDF1-F priv n , F pub n , F leak ), A explicitly outputs 0 with probability of 1. Therefore, KDF1-pub-RO n is differentiable from pub-RO nm . We can prove that KDF2-pub-RO n and KDF3-pub-RO n are differentiable from pub-RO nm s by using the same as the above attack. To avoid the attack, we define the privleak-RO to avoid the above attack.
privleak-RO
Since no simulator can know whether a pair in L leak is defined on the public interface or the private interface, the above attack works. So we define privleak-RO so that S can know all input-output pair defined on the private interface. Privleak-RO consists of a random oracle . The description is as follows.
When the output size of a RO is b-bits, we denote it by privleak-RO b .
Indifferentiability Results for KDFs
We show that KDFs using pub-RO n are indifferentiable from privleak-RO nm as follows.
We give the proof of KDF1-pub-RO n privleak-RO in Subsection 4.4. We can prove that KDF2-pub-RO n privleak-RO and KDF3-pub-RO n privleak-RO by the same as the proof of Theorem 5. So we ommit these proofs. 
Proof of Theorem 5
Recall the experiment of this proof. A interacts with (KDF1-pub-RO n , F n , F leak ) or (F priv mn , S Fn , S leak ) where S Fn is a simulator of F pub n and S leak is a simulator of F leak . We define a simulator S = (S Fn , S leak ) that simulates F n and F leak as follows. Let F S be a (initially everywhere ⊥) table that stores all input-output values of S Fn .
Since a last 64 bit value of an input of F n in KDF1-F n is one of { 0 , . . . , m − 1 }, on a query x where x [64] ∈ { 0 , . . . , m − 1 } the output is defined by using F pub mn and on other type queries the outputs are defined by a random choice. We define F leak such that it leaks input-output pairs of S Fn and pairs that are defined by using F leak .
We give a proof using the game sequences Game 0, Game 1, ..., Game 6 that are shown in Figs. 1, 2, 3 , 4, 5 and 6. Without loss of generality, we assume that distinguisher A does not 
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A.1 Random Oracle with Extension and Inverse Attacks
The extension attack is that for the DMMD hash function DM-MD
The inverse attack is that an input-output triple (k, x, y) of the ideal cipher can be obtained from DM-
. Therefore, we define EIRO such that F n (M ||m) can be obtained from F n (M ) and m and (k, x, y) can be obtained from F n (M ) and F n (M ||k).
The description of EIRO is shown in Fig. 7 . EO is the oracle that realizes the extension attack (line 103 and line 104) and IO is the oracle that realizes the inverse attack (line 203 and line 204).
A.2 Indifferentiability Result for DMMD Hash Function in the Ideal Cipher Model
We prove that the DMMD hash function is indifferentiable from EIRO as follows.
where A can make queries to DM- The proof is shown in Appendix A.4.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We define a simulator S = (S E , S D ) as follows where S E and S D are simulators of E and D respectively.
We give a proof using the game sequences Game 0, Game 1, and Game 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that distinguisher A does not repeat a query to any of its oracles.
Game 0 → Game 1: We show that Game 0 is equal to Game 1 unless the following bad events occur. In order to prove that Game 0 is equal to Game 1 unless the following bad events occur, we show the following three points. . The proof of the theorem is completed.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We define simulator S = (S EO , S IO ) as follows. Simulator S: S EO (m, x): y ← E(m, x) and S returns y. S IO (m, y), x ← E −1 (m, y) and S returns x. The running time of S is at most O(q E ) time.
This proof utilizes the proof of Theorem 6. The proof involves a hybrid argument starting in the EIRO scenario, and ending in the ideal cipher scenario through a sequence of mutually indistinguishable hybrid games. .
